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ABSTRACT
This article explores the new trends of Islamic radicalism through missionary jihad 
against a blasphemer (Ahok) as part of the jihad for the NKRI (Unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia). The trend of radical dakwah in online media is interesting 
to research, regardless of the interest of the local election, or Caliphate and NKRI 
sharia on the other hand. The purpose of this research is to find out the trend of 
radical dakwah in online media by calling jihad against a blasphemer as part of the 
NKRI jihad and its implication. The questions in this study will be examined using 
the theory of domination of interests (hegemony), given the position of the radicals 
is to seize the hegemony of society through online viral media. In conclusion, the use 
of the term Jihad against a blasphemer, and political branding that radical groups 
still maintain the integrity of the NKRI is a hegemonic form to defeat the cultural 
power of the moderate, tolerant, and plural Muslims.  These radicals, together 
with the intellectual actors behind them, realize that in order to gain legitimacy 
of religious power, they must collaborate with the MUI (fatwa institution), then 
use social media to invite all to participate to do counter discourse. After that, they 
collaborated with politicians to advocate the idea they propose. Finally, they use 
symbolic Islamic slogans to bring Muslims to the struggle that they do.             
Keywords : Blasphemer, Hegemonic  Jihad, Radicalism
1 The authors would like to record special appreciation and credit to the funding sup-
port for the research project. This research was possibly accomplished with the financial sup-
port by the BOPTN DIPA UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta fund through the Decision of the 
Budget User of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta Number: Un.01/ KPA/569/2017 concerning 
Recipients of Financing for Research at the UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta 2017 Fiscal Year, 
Research Cluster of Development of Islamic Studies on 25 July 2017.
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INTRODUCTION
It was Tuesday, 27 September 2016 when a story began. A speech delivered 
by the Jakarta Governor, Basuki Cahaya Purnama or often called Ahok 
during his visit to the Pramuka Island of Seribu Islands is considered to be 
blasphemy. In his visit to the cultivation program funded by the Provincial 
Government of Jakarta, Ahok mentioned Surat al-Maidah verse 51 as one 
of the verses used to “deceive” the public. Nine days after this speech was 
delivered, precisely on 6 October 2016, a video recording of Ahok’s speech 
was uploaded via Buni Yani’s Facebook account entitled “Blasphemy against 
Religion?” With Ahok’s speech transcription. Ahok’s speech on Seribu 
Islands left many problems in the future. Reports and complaints to the police 
came in a row, both from FPI and MUI, participating as the reporter.2 Various 
media outlets responded to Ahok›s viral speech as hot news from the capital 
city of Jakarta. It even became national scale news delivered to the Indonesian 
people from Sabang to Merauke, although Ahok has offered his apology to 
the public. 3
Viral online media about blasphemy led to mass mobilization of Muslims, 
the Islamic community movement 411, the Muslim movement 212, to the 
Muslim movement 505 who are radical and intolerant. Mobilization and call 
for radical dakwah through the moment and event of the Islamic movement 
is inseparable from the role of online media, both news and social media such 
as Twitter, Facebook,  YouTube, blogs  or Whatsapp  applications  by blowing 
up the case massively as a radical propaganda to attract the sympathy of 
Muslims.  In this case, Tri Pujiati considered that social media propaganda 
was used as a useful means of radical dakwah. Openly, the propaganda was 
carried out to recruit as many people as possible face to face. As a result, a large 
number of victims were those in their teens who in fact were active users of 
social media. The age range of 15-25 years is vulnerable and easily influenced 
and swayed to show self existence.4
Nafi Muthohirin argued that  in the second decade of the 21st century 
there appeared the tendency of radical groups to increase their interaction 
2 Ismantoro Dwi Yuwono, Gara-Gara Ahok dari Kegaduhan ke Kegaduhan (Yogyakar-
ta: Media Pressindo, 2017), 311-314; for further reference, see also Abdul Malik, “Agitasi dan 
Propaganda di Media Sosial (Studi Kasus Cyberwar Antar-Netizen terkait Dugaan Penistaan 
Agama oleh Basuki Tjahaja Purnama),” Jurnal Lontar, Vol 4 No 3 (September – Desember 
2016), 7-8. 
3 Ahmad Junaidi, “Media dan Keberagaman: Analisis Pemberitaan Media Daring Sep-
utar Pemilihan Kepala Daerah DKI Jakarta,” Jurnal Muara Ilmu Sosial, Humaniora, dan Seni, 
(Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2017), 330-334.
4 Tri Pujiati, “Dakwah Radikal dan Propaganda Media Sosial,” in http://jalandamai.
org/dakwah-radikal-dan-propaganda-media-sosial.html
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and propaganda.  They make certain pages to spread ideas and hate, 
radicalism, threats, and provide tutorial on how to make bombs. A number 
of websites have their identities hidden with unknown encryption technology 
tools. Even with such tight control, radical groups can still find their way and 
continue to use anonymous accounts. The use of pictorial memes containing 
radical messages is also created in order to attract the sympathy of young 
people.  Then, consistently and creatively, the meme images are posted and 
shared on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and WhatsApp reaching thousands 
of netizens in a short time.5
Radical dakwah in online media regarding Ahok’s speech on the Pramuka 
Island of the Thousand Islands gave a real picture of the radical resistance 
movement to the existing situation. Even the slogans and jargons that have 
always been the source of online media struggle by radicals call for dakwah to 
carry out jihad against the blasphemer as part of the NKRI jihad. The slogan 
that is always echoed is: “Ready for jihad? Ready to defend the country, ready 
to defend Islam, ready to defend NKRI (the Unitary State of the Republic of 
Indonesia?).”6 This slogan became a hash-tag on various social media by always 
referring to Ahok as “the blasphemer” of ethnic Chinese who has disturbed 
the harmony and sovereignty of Muslims in the Republic of Indonesia. Even 
the radicals have publicly stated that Ahok is the threat that divides the tribes 
and nations and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is under threat 
and expansion of the Chinese State.7
With regard to the various polemics and discourses, this will  give birth to 
a hypothesis that the hashtags of jihad against the blasphemer, jihad NKRI 
became a propaganda trend for radicals in some online media that are always 
viral in the last period in this country.  All radical propaganda, issues and 
movements have made the speech of “the blasphemer” the beginning of 
resistance (jihad) which bring diverse responses and analyses. Is it for the sake 
of DKI Jakarta elections on the one hand, or for the interest of the Caliphate 
and NKRI in sharia on the other. In this light, it is interesting to carry out this 
research.
5 Nafi Muthohirin, “Mewaspadai Radikalisme Islam di Media Sosial,” in http://geo-
times.co.id/mewaspadai-radikalisme-islam-di-media-sosial/
6 The call for jihad bela NKRI is first launched by Habib Rizieq acting as the Imam 
Besar Front Pembela Islam in the middle of the crowd for his special speech in for the Forum 
Umat Islam (FUI) members and supporters doing protest vigil in front of the house of parlia-
ment (Gedung DPR RI). The related news about the FPI and radical movement organizations 
with the slogan of Jihad NKRI can be read here http://nasional.kini.co.id/2017/02/21/20880/
habib-rizieq-ajak-massa-jihad-bela-negara-bela-islam-dan-nkri
7 The statement by radicalism movements can be found here https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=lAlkdqIpLi0 
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To frame this research as a scientific product, there are two aspects that the 
writer focus on. Why did the radical dakwah trend occur in online media by 
calling on jihad against the blasphemer as part of the NKRI jihad? What are the 
implications of the radical dakwah trend in online media by calling on jihad 
against the blasphemer as part of NKRI jihad? Two focus issues will be explored 
using the qualitative research method and Antonio Gramsci’s theory will be 
used as a perspective framework of the phenomenon. In addition, the author 
will also limit the phenomenon of jihad against the blasphemer in the Jakarta 
local elections  because the issue of blasphemy and the anarchic behavior of 
radical groups against others is often seen not only in the momentum of the 
Local Elections.
ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN MEDIA CONSIDERATION
It was  the dictum  After 9/11 2001  tragedy,  which became the beginning of 
Islam, radicalism, and terrorism to be re-discussed;  whether it is academic 
discourse, mass media and electronics, or ethnographic translation discussed 
by people in their respective environments.  J. Esposito said that this 9/11 
2001 tragedy was a global shock and had a poorly perceptual impact on Islam 
itself. Moreover, this call for resistance to Islam was carried out by a president 
of a superpower like America. J. Esposito revealed:
“For many, understanding Islam and Muslims can be confusing. Muslim 
leaders speak of Islam as a religion of peace and justice;  Osama 
bin Laden and other Muslim terrorists slaughter non-Muslims and 
Muslims globally. President George W. Bush referred to Islam as a 
religion of peace; the Franklin Graham evangelist called Islam an evil 
religion; Samuel Huntington, prominent Harvard professor and author 
of The Clash of Civilizations, wrote, ‘Islam has bloody borders. . . and 
innards. ‘’ But, as President Barrack Obama has pointed out, ‘’ Islam has 
demonstrated through words and the possibilities of religious tolerance 
and racial equality. . . . Partnership between America and Islam must be 
based on what Islam is, not what it isn’t.’’8 
The ambiguity of this diverse definition of Islam finally presented the religion 
in various new ‘logos’.  Radical Islam, fundamental Islam, liberal Islam, 
moderate Islam, and inclusive Islam.  All of these logos have an impact on 
the choice of attitudes of Muslims in the world including in Indonesia. Today, 
when discussing Indonesia’s Islam, it cannot be completed in the space of 
moderation of the two major powers of Islamic organizations (Nahdlatul 
8 J. Esposito, The Future Of Islam, (New York : Oxford University Press, 2010), 01 
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Ulama and Muhammadiyah). In Indonesia, many Islamic variants have been 
reduced rather than ways of thinking, acting, and they are associated with one 
another.
The discourse variants related to the Islamic attitudes above are inseparable 
from the global concessions, especially the tragedy in the reform era (burning 
of Christian houses of worship in some areas) and the Bali bombing tragedy 
in 2002. At that time, the contestation of Islamism (read: Islamic ideals and 
attitudes, not Islamic ideology) are again discussed in the public space. There 
are many intellectual actors who will return the Islamic discourse in that 
era. Among those who represent moderate groups are Abdurrahman Wahid, 
Nur Chalis Madjid, as well as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah Muslim 
scholars.  The liberal group is represented by Ulil Abshar Abdallah, Lutfi 
A., Muqsith Ghazali, and those who are gathered in the Jakarta Utan Kayu 
Community.  On the other side, there are Isamail Yusanto, Hatono Ahmad 
Jaiz, and Addian Husaeni, intellectual groups who are more conservative 
in their thought. On the movement side, names such as Abdullah Sungkar, 
Abu Bakar Baasyir, and Imam Samudera, were represented by the Jemaah 
Islamiyah movement group which in the Soeharto era was alienated due to 
rebellion to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia.9 Because of the length of 
the debate on Islamism and the attitudes of nationalism in Indonesia, all of 
them have been recorded by academics to read the current phenomena. So 
this study focuses on two important aspects: first, reframing the contestation of 
Islamic radicalism and religio-nationalism in the online media in recent years, 
particularly in the past ten years. Of course by making representation of the 
two groups that have debated on how to present Islam in Indonesia. Second, 
the shift of radical groups in campaigning their radical ideas through radical 
group organization websites, social media, and several articles submitted to 
Islamic nuance newspaper like Republika.              
At the beginning of the reform, access to information and radical ideas was 
not as easy as it is today. Transmission of information related to radicalism, 
its tendency, can only be accessed through print reporting, very rarely based 
on online networking. Therefore, this paper will seek to discuss the discourse 
on Islamic radicalism in media coverage, and patterns of change.  The first 
period, in the 2001-2005 era, where the contestation of Islamic ideas took 
place in a narrow space especially in the newspaper information booth. The 
second period, 2005-2010,  internet-based information  access  has begun 
to spread in Indonesia.  The internet could even be accessed by the village 
community, although it is still based on internet provider stalls. In the same 
9 Din Wahid, “Kembalinya Konservatisme Islam Indonesia,” Studia Islamika, (Vol. 21 
No. 2 2014), 387.
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year, social media has also begun to be in demand by the community as an 
alternative media to get the latest information. Finally, in the period of 2010 
to present, where access to information is already in the grip of a smart phone, 
the community involvement in social media has become more active than 
before. This is coupled with the existence of news television station which has 
become the dominant source of information in the community. Borrowing 
the terminology in the media center of political actors,  today is the era of 
generation Z, the generation that understands and wants to always be involved 
in every activity of (digital) virtual life.
In this early period, radical groups and at the same time moderate groups in 
Indonesia contested through print media; whether it is owned by religious 
organizations, or national media that provides a column of opinions where 
the outside community can contribute their thoughts. Syamsul Rizal’s research 
identified several magazines / print media that had affiliations with radical 
groups. For example; Sabili, Ummi, Annida, Tarbawi, Saksi, 10 Arie Styaningrum 
Pamungkas also conducted a similar research on several radical media in 
Indonesia that were disseminated by radical groups. Unlike Rizal, Pamungkas 
is more specific about talking about the impact of “Ummi’s da’wah media” in 
the process of constructing an understanding of Islamism and radicalism in 
Indonesia.11 In the national newspaper contestation which has more concern 
about the pattern and Islamic life in Indonesia such as Republika. Discourse 
related to radicalism can be more open compared to magazines that are made 
and published by themselves. The following are some of the contestations that 
occurred after radicalism emerged into open space in Indonesia in that period 
in the Republika newspaper.
There are two important ideas related to Islamic radicalism in Indonesia; first 
groups that calls on the government (as a regulator) to fight such movement 
because it would pose a serious threat to the condition of plurality in Indonesia, 
as well as the idea of  the need for the re-actualization of values  that did not 
have the motive of forced ideology to be understood. Second, a counter-
discourse that calls on the government not to juxtapose terrorists and radical 
attitudes with Islam. In this context, almost all Islamic dakwah media have 
the same tendency. The first groups are, for example the works of Rumadi,12 
10 Syamsul Rizal, “Media and Islamism in Post New Order Indonesia; The Case of 
sabili, Studia Islamika Vol 12 No 3 , 2005, 431 
11 Arie Setyaningrum Pamungkas, “The Dakwah Media in Post Soeharto Indonesia; 
From Politics Identity to popular culture; The Case of Ummi, Phd Thesis Universitas Berlin 
2015.  
12 Rumadi, “Demokrasi dan Radikalisme Agama” in Surat Kabar Republika Jakarta, 
Edisi Kamis, 2 Juni 2002.
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Riza Sahbudi13, Umarudin Masdar,14 and Dawam Rahardjo.15 While from the 
second group, there are papers from Addian Husaeni and Isma’il Yusanto who 
defended Islamism from the frame of absolute universalism. That is, Islam 
cannot be identified with radical and explosive movements as broadcast in the 
context of terrorism in Indonesia.16     
Contestation as I stated above, can only be accessed by a number of community 
groups. The spread of magazines and newspapers made by radical groups 
is certainly very minimal, community-based, and those who are interested 
in Islamic issues in Indonesia. Framing Islamism and how discourse 
contestation in newspapers, electronic media, and several other magazines 
are not as numerous as in Hidayatullah, Sabili, Republika, etc. Almost all 
national newspapers focus more on reporting on economic, political, and 
social conditions, as well as sports, which in segmentation of market share 
is more favored than raising ideas and Islamic contestations that have been 
debated time after time in Indonesia. Another possibility is that in the national 
newspapers and television, the editors are more aware of the importance of 
the idea of  multiculturalism, pluralism and tolerance, rather than framing the 
importance of Islamic-based life in Indonesia.
In the second period, the period that has begun to change from the print 
tradition to virtual and online based. This seems to make the government 
and other elements of society who are anxious about the existence of radical 
groups begin to think to find ways to anticipate it. The researchers have also 
shifted from a large paradigm to a more post-modernist tradition, where one 
postulate is framed in certain conditions and realities. It is almost impossible 
to generalize what websites created by these radical groups are identified to 
automatically have affiliations with certain groups. In fact, as explained by the 
Ministry of Communication and Information of the Republic of Indonesia, 
starting from the beginning of 2010 there have been 814,594 sites contending 
the call for radicalism blocked by the government.17 After the 2008 ITE Law 
was passed, the government did not hesitate to publish to the public to be 
13 Riza Sihbudi Islam, “Radikalisme dan Demokrasi,” in Surat Kabar Republika Jakar-
ta, Edisi Kamis, 23 September 2004.                                
14 Umaruddin Masdar, “Globalisasi dan Radikalisasi Massa” in Harian Pagi Repub-
lika Jakarta, Edisi Jumat, 04 Juli 2003.
15 M. Dawam Rahardjo, “Fatwa MUI Cermin Radikalisasi Syariat Islam,” in Harian 
Pagi Republika, Edisi Jumat, 20 Desember 2005. 
16 Adian Husaini, “Simpang Siur Radikalisme,” in Harian Pagi Republika Edisi Jumat, 
01 Desember 2005. 
17 See also that the Kominfo has blocked the sum of 814.594 sites.  https://kominfo.
go.id/index.php/content/detail/5083/Kominfo+Sudah+Blokir+814.594+Situs+Radikal+/0/
sorotan_med (retrieved on 21 Nopember 2017) 
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more self-aware in rsponding radical sites in Indonesia.18 The government’s 
assertive attitude towards radical groups shows that the existence of radical 
sites began to disrupt the stability of Muslims in Indonesia, as well as escalating 
dynamics of the national politics.
The government explained that the blocking was carried out because of the 
content with nuances of resistance to the government, an invitation to jihad 
against the government, and a distortion of the Pancasila ideology that had 
been agreed upon by a pluralistic Indonesian society. In this context, the 
government did not fight against Islam, but rather the Islamic groups who 
began inviting ways of treason against the state. However, what is unique is 
perhaps in the era of democracy, taking sides which has been demonstrated 
by the government as previously discussed, is not necessarily acceptable to 
the people of Indonesia. The battle ideas reappeared to adorn the debate 
on partiality. The general trend is that first, radical group sites have framed 
government policy as an arrogant and anti-democratic form of democracy. 
Second, the government treatment is considered part of a political strategy to 
eliminate Islam. Third, the government treatment is anti-Islamic and supports 
the secular paradigm. And the most interesting thing is that whatever the 
problem and policy made by the government, they always offer an Islamic 
system and an Islamic state as a solution to their readers. In fact, they did 
not argue whether the Islamic system offered provided space for freedom of 
expression as democracy implanted in the values  of its government.
The last is the millennial era where the government has to work extra to be 
able to stem radicalism and how they spread radical ideas. The era where all 
media can be created, privatized, then distributed without people being able to 
monitor simultaneously. In this era, the existence of websites, blogs, and other 
online media products, has been linked to private space like BBM, Twitter, 
WhatsApp, telegram, and Facebook. In this private room, as a rule of thumb, 
the provider is very guarded. No one can manage this space, unless they make 
it. Recently, the government asked the owner of the Telegram social media to 
give the government access in order to be able to observe radical groups on 
their sharing channels.19 Like it or not, telegram provides some features that are 
timed and can disappear without the government’s knowledge (secret chat). 
According to the government, the telegram channel also provides content 
that has nuances of radicalism, terrorism and calls to assemble bombs.20 In 
18 See also that the Kominfo BNPT asks for the ban of 22 sites https://kominfo.go.id/
index.php/content/detail/4627/BNPT+Minta+Kominfo+Blokir+22+Situs+Radikal/0/beri-
ta_satker (retrieved on 21 Nopember 2017)
19 https://news.okezone.com/read/2017/07/16/337/1737475/telegram-diblokir-joko-
wi-kita-sudah-lama-amati-dan-ini-demi-keamanan-negara 
20http://tekno.kompas.com/read/2017/07/14/20495927/ini-alasan-pemerin-
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privatized spaces like this, reframing what is actually spread by radical groups 
is no longer easy. What is certain is that they voiced themselves for jihad 
against the government, jihad against the West and American antagonism, 
and other ideological content, as already described in the general character of 
radical movements in Indonesia. 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Apart from the dimensions of political strategy, debates on social media, 
to mainstream media, between Islamic groups to fight the political power 
of Ahok, there is a topic that will actually be discussed more in this study, 
namely the call for jihad to fight religious enemies and jihad for the Unitary 
State of the Republic of Indonesia. Jihad against religious enemies because of 
the momentum of Rizieq Shihab’s speech at the second 212 demonstration 
(February 21, 2017) in front of the Parliament’s office. The speech was actually 
a common occurrence in radical Islamic circles, especially for the Islamic 
Defenders Front.21 However, the unique thing is what it really means by 
defending the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia in the frame of this 
radical group. Are they going to present Islam as a political system, or just call 
the substantive norms of Islam become the basis of the process and basis for 
determining the existing policies in Indonesia.22
Other facts related to radical groups and the Unitary State of the Republic 
of Indonesia, such as FPI, FUI, and other groups that still consider that 
the the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia need not be changed are 
available on the official website of the Islamic Defenders Front. (http://www.
mozaikharokahfpi.com/search/label/Politik) and official habibrizieq.com 
(although in the process of this research, the site has been blocked / hacked, 
because it was inaccessible). These pages clearly state that they want to defend 
the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) from liberalism,23 
communism,24 and foreign imperialism.25 On the other hand, the activities 
of this group are not in accordance with the ethical patterns that exist within 
the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. They tend to 
tah-blokir-telegram
21 http://www.voa-islam.com/read/indonesiana/2013/02/26/23405/wawasan-ke-
bangsaan-habib-rizieq-soal-nkri-dan-gerakan-separatisme/#sthash.8wNOayNJ.7cyUCJr4.
dpbs
22 http://www.voa-islam.com/read/indonesiana/2014/06/06/30786/habib-rizieq-
per da- syariat -sejalan-dengan-konstitusi-nkri-ideologi-pdip-anti-islam/ 
23 http://www.mozaikharokahfpi.com/2015/09/fpi-dengan-dukungan-penuh-kopas-
sus-dan.html  
24 http://www.mozaikharokahfpi.com/2015/08/pernyataan-sikap-dpp-fpi-terhadap.
html  
25 http://www.mozaikharokahfpi.com/2015/07/ada-israel-di-tolikara.html 
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use anarchic methods to uphold their beliefs. They are also very concerned 
about the issue of defamation and the existence of religion, especially Islam. 
Moreover, they also pay attention to what is done by campus activist groups 
who tend to have Western thoughts, and so on.
In this light, it is not wrong then if the government and several regional heads 
urge FPI to continue to work on the whole the Unitary State of the Republic 
of Indonesia. For example, at the 19th FPI anniversary event Aneis Baswedan 
congratulated and hoped that FPI could maintain the integrity of the Unitary 
Republic of Indonesia and the diversity that has existed in Indonesia.26 The 
coverage by hidatullah.com also gave the title “Affirm the commitment 
to protect the the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, FPI held the 
19th Anniversary and the Commemoration of the Republic of Indonesia’s 
Anniversary.27  Or the coverage by merdeka.com is similar; the headline used 
is that FPI will guard the NKRI from divisive groups.28 Even so on the official 
FPI website, they made a title that was more interesting, they mentioned that 
FPI celebrated the anniversary and at the same time committed to maintaining 
the integrity of the the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.29 And 
there are still many other reports that mention similar patterns related to the 
relationship between FPI and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.
Different on official pages, or in other radical Islamist groups, national media 
often frames FPI and some groups uphold Islamic sharia without changing 
the NKRI (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) into an Islamic state, 
as an anti-NKRI group. This is because what is disclosed and implemented in 
the form of action does not apply equally. For example in several cases FPI 
carried out activities that “violated” compliance as citizens against existing 
constitutions; insulting Pancasila,30 cross out the red and white flag,31 refused 
the construction of houses of worship of other religions,32 or the rejection 
of groups that do not agree with them through anarchic means. Therefore, 
portraits and slogans campaigned and endorsed by political actors on the 
26 https://www.antaranews.com/berita/647554/anies-minta-fpi-jaga-nkri-dan-ke-
bhinekaan 
27 https://www.hidayatullah.com/berita/nasional/read/2017/08/19/121780/teguh-
kan-komitmen-jaga-nkri-fpi-gelar-milad-ke-19-dan-peringatan-hut-ri.html
28 https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/fpi-kami-akan-jadi-garda-terdepan-jaga-
nkri-dari-kelompok-pemecah-belah-bangsa.html
29 http://www.mozaikharokahfpi.com/2015/09/fpi-dengan-dukungan-penuh-kopas-
sus-dan.html  
30 http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt581324d499b3f/dinilai-menghi-
na-pancasila--ketua-fpi-dilaporkan-ke-bareskrim 
31 http://news.liputan6.com/read/2833684/polisi-pembawa-bendera-dicoret-ter-
sangka-dan-simpatisan-fpi 
32 http://www.beritasatu.com/megapolitan/421380-ini-alasan-massa-tolak-pemban-
gunan-gereja-santa-clara.html 
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existence of FPI wanting to keep the the Unitary State of the Republic of 
Indonesia needs reinterpretation. This seems like the lips service of FPI leaders 
in order not to be the main opponent of the government.
The same pattern is also true for other radical groups, if one looks at what 
appears in cyberspace coverage. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) which 
is the accomplice of the transnational movement, Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, 
and several other groups that play the political stage as models of their 
movements, often mention that NKRI is final. NKRI has become the result 
of joint ijtihad which cannot be contested. The following is some news related 
to PKS supporting the NKRI; republika.co.id “PKS initiates the Integrity of 
NKRI”33, on the party’s official website, “PKS Legislator, NKRI is Undisputed” 
34 and “PKS shows a sense of nationalism and NKRI is undisputed”35. This is 
the case with Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) , which today is on the verge 
of dissolution by the government. On various occasions, the chairman of 
HTI has always emphasized that HTI activities are not in conflict with the 
Pancasila and NKRI,36 HTI contributes to strengthening the Unitary State of 
the Republic of Indonesia by educating the public,37 and HTI only provides 
ideas for discussion to find the best format for the Republic of Indonesia.38
From this fact it is clear that calls of anti-Pancasila, the Unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia, and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) are 
only made in closed spaces. They do not declare themselves as a group that 
wants to establish a different system with four national pillars in Indonesia. 
Occasionally they did not agree on Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the 
diversity that existed in Indonesia, but they still wanted to take refuge behind 
the term of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Or conversely, 
they doubted the existence of a unitary state system (republic), but still 
acknowledged the diversity that existed in Indonesia as an authentic form and 
destiny of the Almighty. Moreover, it must be admitted, the diction and logos 
that they use in political contestation are indeed more often hypocritical, just 
to get support from the plural Indonesian society. They did not hesitate to 
claim to be the most nationalist and supporters of the Republic of Indonesia if 
33 http://www.republika.co.id/berita/gaya-hidup/trend/17/05/03/en/islam-in-archi-
pelago/13/11/21/nasional/daerah/13/10/30/mvh5rm-pks-sulut-keutuhan-nkri-harga-mati 
34 http://pks.id/content/legislator-pks-nkri-harga-mati 
35 http://www.pkskabsmg.id/2017/10/09/kader-pks-tunjukan-sikap-nasional-
isme-yang-tinggi-nkri-harga-mati/ 
36 https://nasional.tempo.co/read/873786/disebut-usung-konsep-khilafah-di-indo-
nesia-ini-pengakuan-hti 
37 https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/1203734/13/ismail-yusanto-kegia-
tan-hti-tak-bertentangan-dengan-pancasila-1494310247 
38 http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2017/05/09/hti-bantah-tudingan-tidak-pu-
nya-kontribusi-bagi-negara 
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they were already in a state of political contestation. Or, this is just an anecdote 
on social media, these radical groups are impromptu nationalist groups. 
Suddenly nationalists after being suspended, suddenly nationalists after being 
disbanded, were suddenly nationalist after their followers were abandoned.
As explained above how radical groups wrap up their political movements in 
the online media space. The simple thing to translate is that they show Islamic 
symbols as part of their struggle. In addition, hey do not display treason 
efforts as often directed at them. They, in my one-sided perspective, play the 
role of Islamism on the the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia frame. 
So, in this way, their existence cannot be rejected by all groups in Indonesia, 
especially Muslims. Perhaps it will be a little different if the Islamic features they 
use exactly the same as the covert ideology they indoctrinate to all members 
of the organization. For example they use different names than the origin of 
their group. The callers’ association of Jihad against religious opponents is the 
National Movement for Guarding the Fatwa of the Indonesian Ulema Council 
(GNPF MUI). They are separated from one institution and side by side with 
the religious authority in Indonesia.
In addition to hiding some of the radical39 characteristics of the group, they 
also played with the sentiment of Muslims through a very provocative diction. 
For example, jihad, infidels, religious opponents, and Chinese. The word jihad, 
in the Islamic tradition is an attitude of sincerity to defend religion. The word 
jihad also has implications for sacrifices that have no limits for those who have 
the power to do it. The word jihad also means warfare to those who persecute 
society. And, what is shown in the Jakarta regional election, Ahok is often 
illustrated as a very anti-Islamic figure,40  Ahok interpreted the scriptures 
of others, and Ahok evicted poor Muslims in Jakarta and collaborated with 
Chinese people who have more capital to build grand buildings in Jakarta. 
And there are still many other issues framed by this radical group. Therefore, 
the simple answer to the question why it was viral on social media, because 
they played with the sentiment and sense of ownership of Muslims in religion 
which is believed to be true.
In addition, they also categorized Ahok as an infidel. The infidels in the 
Islamic dictionary are indeed prohibited from being a leader. The word kafir is 
“the enemy” of the Prophet Muhammad when leading Islam. The word Kafir 
is a word intended for anyone who is hostile to Islam. And, it must also be 
realized that, the prohibition of an infidel as a leader is certain (qath’i). As 
39 Atmaja (2016) provides a discussion of the ambiguous terminology of what is so 
called terrorism. This might be true for the case of the terminology of radicalism as well. 
40 https://www.eramuslim.com/berita/nasional/heboh-ahok-melarang-sembelih-kur-
ban.htm 
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for the debate of Muslim scholars, in a space far from the crowd related to 
the Kafir interpretation, it seems that it cannot be accepted by the majority 
of Indonesian people who have experience in religious education in a very 
rural environment. Therefore, when the word Kafir is identified with Ahok, 
there is no other reason to see the true side of Ahok; Ahok is a non-Muslim. 
Moreover, when Ahok had to face the verdict as a person who defamed Islam 
by the Religious Decision of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), the MUI 
Deputy Secretary General Tengku Zulkarnain defined Ahok as a person to 
fight against and his blood is permitted to kill, in the dialog at the Indonesian 
Lawyer Club.  
On the other hand, Ahok is a non-Indigenous person. Ahok comes from 
ethnic minorities, but has a history of dominating the economic sphere  in 
Indonesia. So clearly, people’s sentiment against the figure of Ahok can be 
framed from these various aspects. Ahok can be drowned out through the 
issue of religion-based, because he is practicing blasphemy, and this is still a 
living conflict that has no base in Indonesia. Ahok is also a figure of ethnic 
Chinese descent who has a dark history in Indonesia, and Ahok also has 
conflicttual political communication and no-compromise attitude when 
dealing with other political actors.41
Finally, this is perhaps very subjective, but it can be verified. The Ahok factor 
and the strengthening the attitude of conservatism and Islamism in the world, 
as well as the moral support provided by the MUI, and there is one more 
namely the Team Buzzer and the Media Center of the Political Parties of all 
parties who contested in the Jakarta Regional Election, have contributed to 
such contestation. For political observers, social media, and young people, 
today’s cyber war is definitely supported by trained Human Resources. The 
Media Center Teams of each candidate can play various social media accounts 
in one hand. They can make tranding topics using robotic accounts and 
networks that they have. In my observation, all social media teams in the 
Jakarta regional election played like they were fighting in the real sense. It was 
obvious how the three candidates’ hash-tags appeared when the debate took 
place in the Election process. In my opinion, all these elements provide a very 
strong slender for why the issue of jihad against religious issues can hit the 
social media.
There are two effects of Islamic radicalism preaching that took place in the 
Jakarta Election: First, the impact on the internal Muslims themselves. Second, 
the external impact on the integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia 
41 For further information about Ahok profile’s, see Rudi Valinka, A Man Called Ahok: 
Sepenggal Kisah Perjuangan & Ketulusan (Kurawa: 2016).
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based on Pancasila, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, and the 1945 Constitution. In the 
first part, radical groups’ propaganda through social media has implications 
for demystification of Islamic teachings and figures who support Ahok in 
the post-conflict local election era. that is. For example, how pluralist figures 
such as Syafii Maarif, Said Aqil Siradj, Musthofa Bisri, Nadirsyah Husen, and 
Ahmad Sahal were identified with groups who did not understand Islam 
correctly. In fact, everyone knows, these Islamic thinkers have very much 
work and contributions in terms of moderate Islamic attitudes in Indonesia. 
Radical groups have succeeded in drawing lines of demarcation, which ones 
are truly Islamic, and which groups whose Islam is defeated by tolerant and 
westernized attitudes.
In addition to moderate Islamic figures, this line of demarcation has finally 
stunned young people in this moderate group. Because they are still young, 
the attitude they take is different from that of their neighbors who are wiser in 
acting. Moderate and radical group battles are very visible; such as the rejection 
of Banser and Ansor against Habib Riziq in Bangil Pasuruan, Rejection of 
Felix Shauw and Basallamah in Surabaya, and many other actions which 
were a reaction to the demystification of radical groups to kyai who became 
role models in the Nahdliyin in particular. In addition, the Nahdlatul Ulama 
youths are in fact also very creative in conducting cyber-war. They duplicate 
sites that have Islamic radicalism to make it more tolerant. They create blogs, 
twiter accounts, and Facebook fanspage to counter-fight radical groups who 
have already done so.
As for the external impact, of course, disharmony in the harmony of religious 
people. The discriminatory treatment of Ahok finally has an impact on the 
rejection of Radical-Islamic figures in areas where the majority are Christian 
or other religions. There are many facts of rejection of these radical groups 
in several regions, in Bali for example, or the strict rejection of the Dayak 
community against Tengku Zulkarnaen in Sintang. and several other regions. 
In fact, in the analysis of Idrus Al Hamid, the Jakarta effect also approached 
Jayapura, Manado, and Ambon Maluku. In areas with a majority that are not 
Muslim, they begin to think about how they also want to make rules so that 
prospective regional leaders must have the same religion as the majority of 
the religious communities around them. Of course, this has become very 
counterproductive to the patterns of religious harmony that have long been 
built in Indonesia. It is counter productive to tolerant and moderate symbols 
developed by the government.    
There are four important concepts in discussing the thoughts of Antonio 
Gramsci; culture, hegemony, intellectualism and crisis. In the cultural position, 
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Gramsci talks about how the ruling group plays its role, or it can lose its power. 
In this cultural position, also, the war of position and war of maneuvers are 
defined by Gramsci. In this context, according to Gramsci, a large group that 
has a strong role in forming and developing a cultural value system of a country 
can be defeated by attitudes and maneuvers carried out by militant groups. He 
gave an example of how the hegemonic dogma carried out by the designers 
of the power of Global capitalism could be defeated by communist groups in 
Russia. For Gramsci, a regulation and a search for strategic positions is very 
important to form the supra-structure of culture in a particular country. Stave 
Jones concludes Gramsci’s view as follows:
“..the notion that the economic base determines the operations of an 
ideological and cultural superstructure. He proposes instead that we 
see the relationship between base and superstructure as a reflexive 
and dynamic one. Within this formation, he isolates civil society as 
having a key intermediary role and proposes that both conservative and 
transformative projects attempt to occupy consciousness and everyday 
life through the functioning of a civil society created in their service. To 
change society involves a protracted period of negotiation carried out in 
all the institutions of society and culture.…since it involves elaborating 
subaltern and subordinate elements into a broader cultural and political 
project without dismissing their cultural distinctiveness.”42 
 This quote means that a cultural value and ideology of a nation will 
continue to run dynamically, not statically. He is different from thinkers such 
as Althusser and Karl Marx who consider that the cultural space is influenced 
by piloting ideology and capitalism that play behind a nation’s ideology. For 
Gramsci, an ideology will continue to be dialectically based on the supra-
cultural forces in society. This belief is the one that was found behind the 
phenomena with radical preaching which overcame a long discourse on 
moderatism, liberalism, pluralism and tolerance in Indonesia. The Indonesian 
society has returned to an era where ideology of religion and Indonesian-ness 
is contested through hidden strategies. They, the radical groups, are very well 
aware of not being able to bring up the issue of anti-nationalism in front of 
Indonesian society, but can bring Radical Islamism into a political contestation 
in Indonesia, especially in a democratic society. This is in line with the 
theoretical assumptions developed by Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo which 
stated that democracy has a dual role; giving freedom to act, while providing 
space for developing conservatism and fundamentalism, so that they can rein 
42 Stave Jones, Antonio Gramsci, (Madison Eve, New York: Routledge, 2006), 99.  
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in the condition of society in Indonesia.43
The nest is hegemony. Theoretically Gramsci defines hegemony, as 
quoted by Steve Jones as follows: 
“Instead of seeing the economy as determining culture and politics, 
Gramsci argues that culture, politics and the economy are organized 
in a relationship of mutual exchange with one another, a constantly 
circulating and shifting network of influence. To this process he gives 
the name hegemony and ..... how hegemony differs fundamentally from 
domination. Seeing hegemony as a dynamic process militates against 
the view that students of culture can understand the meaning of a text 
in isolation. In this sense, asking you to analyse a single participatory 
programme was mildly disingenuous, since no one representation can 
capture the nexus of power at any one moment – it is indeed, for Gramsci, 
precisely not something that one can pin down since it is always ‘in the 
process of becoming”.44
It means that Gramsci interprets the word Hegemony instead of focussing 
on domination and the pressures made by certain groups or social classes. 
However, the word hegemony means a dynamic on-going processes which 
can be done in several ways and enforcement. Hegemony, according to 
Gramsci has many factors and variables that can be analyzed, not always 
dominated by aspects of politics, economy, and culture. The basis of Gramsci’s 
epistemology in this hegemony can be assumed to originate from the concept 
of consciousness. A new knowledge or ideology or belief that is put in disguise, 
habituation and implementation (doctrination) into the atmosphere of the 
collective-mass consciousness, giving rise to a relatively new awareness. The 
source of knowledge possessed by individuals in a group, is not always easy to 
guess its origin, but it could be that awareness and knowledge that have been 
settling in society is a hegemonic program instilled by certain group subjects.
Hegemony refers to the notion of a socio-political situation which in Gramsci 
terminology is called a moment, where philosophy and social practices are 
united in a balanced state. Domination is the concept of reality which spreads 
through society in an institution and individual manifestations. The influence 
of this spirit is in the form of morality, customs, religion, political principles 
and all social relations, especially from the intellectual. Hegemony is always 
related to the state as a dictator class.45 Gramci changed the meaning of 
hegemony from strategy which, according to Lenin,  becomes a concept like 
43 Greg Fealy dan Anthony Bubalo, Jejak Kafilah, terj, Akh. Muzakki  (Bandung: Mizan, 
2007), 78.
44 bid. 78.
45  Ibid., 90. 
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the Marxist concept of power and relations of production, class and state, and 
also becomes a means to understand society in order to change it. He develops 
ideas about leadership and their implementation of hegemony. A social group 
can even have to exercise leadership before seizing power of government 
(this is clearly one of the main requirements for obtaining that power); such 
readiness, in turn, becomes very important when the group exercises power, 
they must constantly “lead”.
This concept of hegemony can be traced through Gramsci’s explanation of 
class supremacy. According to him, the supremacy of a group manifests in two 
ways: domination and intellectual leadership. Hegemony refers to the strong 
influence of leadership in moral and intellectual form, which forms a class-
led attitude. This becomes a consensual image. The consensus that occurs 
between these two classes is created through coercion and covert influence 
through knowledge spread through the apparatuses of power. In other words 
hegemony is a chain of victories obtained through a consensus mechanism 
rather than through oppression of other social classes. Basically, hegemony 
is an attempt to lead people to assess and view social problems in a defined 
framework.46 
Practically, according to Gramsci, one can gain hegemony through three 
processes of internalization as follows; first, identity, which is a locus 
that is pinned to someone, whether it is a form of profession or someone’s 
psychological nature. Second, representation, i.e. a person must be able to 
represent another person’s anxiety and similarity that will be influenced by 
his subconscious. Third, institutionalization, namely the institutionalization 
process of ideas and identities that have been read before. Therefore, if one 
looks at what happened in Jakarta, the fight and stakes of whose identity is the 
most Islamic and not full of Islam is carried out by radical groups in launching 
their preaching. They also represent the group from all elements, for example; 
there are Islamists from Nahdlatul Ulama ‘, as is often stated, following KH. 
Ma’ruf Amin who is in fact the Chairperson of NU’s Syuriah. Din Syamsudin 
and Amin Rais from Muhammadiyah, as well as other Islamic groups who 
could be moderate, were not radical. Even nationalist groups cannot escape 
the representation of their groups; there are figures such Prabowo Subianto, 
Kivlan Zein, and several retired high ranking military officers who seem to 
be under the strengthening of Islamism in Indonesia. They also called on the 
MUI as an institutionalization of their ideas and ideas.
Next is intellectualism. For Gramsci intellectualism is an important tool in 
carrying out hegemony or winning ideological or cultural settings. In his book 
46 Peter Mayo, Gramsci and Educational Thought (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2010), 23. 
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Prison, Gramsci defines what he means by intellectualism in social functions; 
“distinct social category independent of class is a myth. All men are potentially 
intellectuals in the sense of having an intellect and using it, but not all are 
intellectuals by social function. Intellectuals in the functional sense fall 
into two groups. In the first place there are the “traditional” professional 
intellectuals, literary, scientific and so on, whose position in the interstices of 
society has a certain inter-class aura about it but derives ultimately from past 
and present class relations and conceals an attachment to various historical 
class formations. Secondly, there are the “organic” intellectuals, the thinking 
and organizing element of a particular fundamental social class. These organic 
intellectuals are distinguished less by their profession, which may be any job 
characteristic of their class, than by their function in directing the ideas and 
aspirations of the class to which they organically belong.”47  
In the Jakarta regional elections, Eep Syaiful Hidayat, Yunarto Widjaya, 
and several branding teams of candidates who have the ability to read voter 
tendencies and Islamic attitudes in Indonesia which can be used by intellectual 
groups that seek to play the issue of diversity becomes viral in the media. Such 
accurate analysis, of course, cannot be done by just anyone. Even by Muslim 
intellectuals themselves. We can still remember that after the Jakarta Election, 
Syafii Maarif targeted successful teams of certain candidates who collaborated 
actively with radical groups in Jakarta. On the same occasion, one of the 
successful teams responded to the statement of concern by demonstrating 
strategic steps to reconnect religious conflicts in Jakarta. He gave an example 
of how at first Jokowi and Prabowo contested, but soon their relationship 
improved, forming Indonesian reconciliation faster than predicted.
The last of the processes of defining Gramsci’s theory is crisis. For Gramsci 
the existence of a crisis is also an important factor in practicing hegemony. He 
said that: 
“In every country the process is different, although the content is the same. 
And the content is the crisis of the ruling class’s hegemony, which occurs either 
because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for 
which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses 
(war, for example), or because huge masses . . . have passed suddenly from 
a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands 
which taken together, albeit not organicall formulated, add up to a revolution. 
A ‘crisis of authority’ is spoken of: this is precisely the crisis of hegemony, or 
47 Antonio Gramsci, Selection From The Prison Notebook, Quintin Hoiare dan Nowell 
Smith (ed), Internasionale, Pullisher New York, 2000. 105. 
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general crisis of the State.”48  
In this case, from my point of view, the demonstration of binding and the 
playing of social media is an attempt to carry out illegal acts on the authority 
of the state so as to create a crisis of trust in the government. The government 
itself has made many efforts to form a different movement pattern.49 However, 
the government maneuvers and political movements would not be able to stop 
what happened in Jakarta. Jakarta has become a vortex of the power of Radical 
Islamism, the stage of intolerant groups, and gained the power legitimacy of 
the Indonesian Ulema Council as a representation of Muslims in general.50
Basically, in my opinion regarding the dynamics of the Jakarta Election, the 
use of the term Jihad against religious enemies, and political branding that 
radical groups maintain the integrity of the the Unitary State of the Republic 
of Indonesia is a hegemonic form used to defeat the power of the moderate, 
tolerant and plural Muslim culture. They, along with the intellectual actors 
behind them, realize that to gain the legitimacy of religious power, they must 
collaborate with MUI (the fatwa institution in particular), then play social 
media card to invite all to participate, counter discourse either through their 
own online media or become resource persons in the national media.51 After 
that, they share with politicians who have an interest in advocating for ideas 
that are initiated. Finally, they use symbolic slogans with Islamic nuances to 
bring Muslims closer to the struggle they will carry out. This is similar to the 
pattern described by Masdar Hilmy regarding how radical groups carried out 
political-strategic resistance to the de-radicalization program launched by the 
government. Needless to say, that they did not carry out terrorist acts in the 
Jakarta Election contest. 
CONCLUSION
 In conclusion, radical propaganda became viral and draws attention 
of Muslims in Indonesia is caused by several factors; first, the political battle 
that presents identity politics in the country. Second, there is a shift in the 
48  Ibid, 192
49 Compare to M. Husein Maruapey, “Penegakan Hukum dan Perlindungan Negara 
(Analisys Kritis terhadap Kasus Penistaan Agama oleh Patahana Gubernur DKI Jakarta,” JIP-
SI: Jurnal Ilmu Politik dan Komunikasi, Vol 7, No 1 (2017), 28-29.
50 Compare to Rahmatul Izad, “Fenomena Penistaan Agama dalam Perspektif Is-
lam dan Filsafat Pancasila (Studi Kasus terhadap Demo Jilid II pada 04 November 2016,” 
Jurnal Panangkaran, (Vol. 1, No. 2, 2017), 178-180. doi:https://doi.org/10.14421/panang-
karan.2017.0101-10.
51 S. Hamdi, “Conflicting Religious Identities: Blaspheming Islam and the Future of 
Democracy in Indonesia,” Al-Albab, 6(2), (2017), 247 - 262. doi:https://doi.org/10.24260/alal-
bab.v6i2.778
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attitude of Islamism in Indonesia; from moderatism to conservativism. Third, 
the diction selected by using an Islamic symbolization approach which are 
literally Islamic teachings. Fourth, the support of the campaigning team and 
intellectual groups in the process of dissemination. There are two impacts 
resulting from this radical dakwah process; first, there was a de-mystification 
of religious leaders (especially those with moderate thought) and the division 
of Muslims in the grassroot. Second, the strengthening of the intolerant 
attitudes shown by Muslims and vice versa of non-Muslims in some regions.
Theoretically, the way we look at today’s media cannot be immediately seen 
from mainstream journalism products, but it is also important to see mutualistic 
relations between social media, political actors, and intellectual actors who act 
play behind the news. At least, through such interpretation, it will produce 
a holistic understanding; including the politics of media owners. Practically, 
this research can be used as a basis for re-interpret how radical groups use 
the issue of saving the the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as a 
hiding space from the ideology they want to display. The government needs 
to rethink how religion and identity politics should be presented in Indonesia, 
so that similar patterns are not copied by other regions in the country. The 
government, despite the fact that it has been done, need not be afraid to block 
the sites that provide calls for radicalism in Indonesia.
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